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Abstract 
This paper offers a new identification strategy for disentangling structural state 
dependence from unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Our strategy exploits 
market environments where there is a choice-consumption mismatch. We first 
demonstrate the effectiveness of our identification strategy in obtaining unbiased 
state dependence estimates via Monte Carlo analysis and highlight its superiority 
relative to the extant choice-set variation based approach. In an empirical 
application that uses data of repeat transactions from the car rental industry, we 
find evidence of structural state dependence, but show that state dependence effects 
may be overstated without exploiting the choice-consumption mismatches that 
materialize through free upgrades.  
   
Keywords: Consumer dynamics; Heterogeneity; Quasi-experiment econometrics; 
Service industry; State dependence.  
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1  Introduction 
Consumer choice shows remarkable stickiness across time. The stickiness may be due to 
persistent unobserved heterogeneity---preferences that differ across consumers but 
remain stable with consumers over time; or due to state dependence---a consumer’s 
current choice drives the higher likelihood of the same choice in the future.4 
Disentangling state dependence from heterogeneity has been a major challenge in the 
literature since Heckman (1981) highlighted the confounding nature of structural state 
dependence and persistent unobserved heterogeneity. The key takeaway is that not 
adequately accounting for heterogeneity can exaggerate the estimated level of state 
dependence. This is not merely an econometric quibble; disentangling these two sources 
of stickiness in choice across time is important in developing dynamically optimal 
policies. For example, the optimality of policies pertaining to advertising (e.g., Dube, 
Hitsch, and Manchanda, 2005; Freimer and Horsky, 2012; Mahajan and Muller, 1986), 
consumer finance (e.g., Barone, Felici, and Pagnini, 2011; Israel, 2005a, 2005b), federal 
procurement (e.g., Greenstein, 1993), health (e.g., Arcidiacono, Khwaja, and Ouyang, 
2012; Handel, 2013; Iizuka, 2012; Janakiraman et. al., 2008; Naik and Moore, 1996), 
housing (e.g., Moon and Stotsky, 1993), labor (e.g., Biewen, 2009; Coelli, Green, and 
Warbuton, 2007; Heckman, 1981; Hyslop, 1999; Prowse, 2012), and pricing (e.g., Che, 
Sudhir, and Seetharaman, 2007; Cosguner, Chan, and Seetharaman, 2012; Dube et. al., 
2008; Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2009, 2010; Pavlidis and Ellickson, 2012) are crucially 
dependent on whether structural state dependence or heterogeneity drives stickiness in 
choice. 
The literature has thus far relied on a combination of functional form assumptions 
about the nature of heterogeneity and choice set variation across time to disentangle 
unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. Early on, researchers highlighted the 
                                                          
4 Some economic mechanisms behind structural state dependence may include consideration set formation, 




role of functional form assumptions on the structure of unobserved heterogeneity, that 
permitted them to numerically integrate out the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on 
choice behavior using simulation-based econometric methods (Arcidiacono, Khwaja, and 
Ouyang, 2012; Erdem and Sun, 2001; Hyslop, 1999; Iizuka, 2012; Keane, 1997; Prowse, 
2012; Seetharaman, 2004), and attribute the residual stickiness in choice behavior to 
state dependence.5 Scholars continue to increase the level of flexibility they allow in the 
functional forms (Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2010; Honore and Kyriazidou, 2000; Moon 
and Stotsky, 1993), to limit the possibility that a lack of adequate accommodation of 
heterogeneity does not lead to exaggerated estimates of state dependence. In recent 
years, researchers in industrial organization and marketing have highlighted the 
importance of choice set variation over time as an essential ingredient of the 
disentangling strategy, beyond the functional form assumptions on unobserved 
heterogeneity. The choice set variation can occur in the form of changes in price (e.g., 
Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2010), advertising (e.g., Terui, Ban, and Allenby, 2011), 
availability of alternatives (e.g., Goldfarb, 2006b), or decision context (e.g., Thomadsen, 
2012). Some scholars have augmented data to include some forms of observable 
heterogeneity either in the form of household demographics (e.g., Goldfarb, 2006a; 
Gupta, Chintagunta, and Wittink, 1997; Paulson, 2011, 2012) or through direct surveys 
of preferences (e.g., Shin, Misra, and Horsky, 2012), but how much residual unobserved 
heterogeneity remains beyond these observable controls remains an issue. Thus, despite 
the large volume of literature on the topic, this identification challenge still remains an 
open area of research, because existing methods are unable to fully disentangle 
unobserved heterogeneity from state dependence.  
In this paper, we introduce a new identification strategy to disentangle state dependence 
and unobserved heterogeneity through only revealed preference data via exclusion 
                                                          
5 Furthermore, researchers have also uncovered variety seeking in choice as a form of “negative” state 




restrictions that arise in market environments where a consumer’s choice may not 
match their consumption.  Consider the following setting in the context of rental cars; 
Customers make reservations for a car ahead of time; but when they arrive to pick up 
the car, the reserved car might be out of stock, and therefore the customer may be 
offered a free upgrade to a different car at no additional cost. Such upgrades due to 
inventory shortages are common in many settings (Biyalogorsky et. al., 1999, 2005; 
Wangenheim and Bayon, 2007), leading to a mismatch between choice and 
consumption. As in the past literature, choice is affected by preferences and state 
dependence, but the consumption based on upgrades only affects state dependence; thus 
providing an exclusion restriction necessary to disentangle state dependence from 
heterogeneity. 
The choice-consumption mismatch can occur in other situations. For instance, free 
samples may induce customers to consume products they had initially chosen not to try 
(Bawa and Shoemaker, 2004; Cabral, 2012; Halbheer et. al., 2013; Pauwels and Weiss, 
2008; Scott, 1976). Stock-outs in online retail would force customers to consume 
alternatives if the item they originally clicked on is no longer available (Anupindi, Dada, 
and Gupta, 1998; Bruno and Vilcassim, 2008; Conlon and Mortimer, 2010, 2013; Diels, 
Wiebach, and Hildebrandt, 2013; Jing and Lewis, 2011; Musalem et. al., 2010). When 
customers make purchases with e-commerce retailers, errors in shipped purchases 
present lead to consumption of products, they were not originally ordered (Collier and 
Bienstock, 2006a; Collier and Bienstock, 2006b; Gregg and Scott, 2008; Vaidyanathan 
and Devaraj, 2008). Finally, product recalls force customers to cease the use of 
originally purchased items in favor of alternatives offered by the firm (Freedman, 
Kearney, and Lederman, 2012; Haunschild and Rhee, 2004; Marsh, Schroeder, and 
Mintert, 2006; Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe, 2007). There are two common 




collect first data on choice before the consumption occurs (e.g., reservations for services, 
items to be or already checked-out in shopping cart). Second, consumption is shifted in 
ways that need not be correlated with unobserved preferences.   
We begin by providing a heuristic proof of why choice-consumption mismatches help 
disentangle state dependence and heterogeneity, and why it is superior to the traditional 
strategy of using choice set variation in combination with rich functional forms to 
accommodate unobserved heterogeneity. We then demonstrate its effectiveness through 
a Monte Carlo analysis, where we simulate data consistent with a simple multinomial 
choice model with both persistent unobserved heterogeneity and structural state 
dependence, accommodating choice set variation and choice-consumption mismatches. 
Estimates from our simulated datasets show that choice set variation does help reduce 
the upward bias, but not as well as the choice-consumption mismatch data. Further 
unlike choice-consumption mismatches, choice set variation does not completely debias 
the state dependence parameter. 
We then perform an empirical analysis using repeat transactions data from the car 
rental service industry. Free upgrades driven by inventory shortages are a common 
occurrence in the industry; therefore this data allows us to exploit mismatch between 
choice and consumption. Our analysis of the upgrading propensity indicates that 
upgrades are more likely to occur when the car class a customer has chosen is in short 
supply---i.e., real time supply conditions at the point of consumption drive the 
upgrading propensity for a customer independent of customer and rental trip 
characteristics, providing us an exogenous source of variation in consumption that is 
independent of customer preferences. 
Our estimates of a model of customer car class choice exploiting the choice-consumption 
mismatch strategy to disentangle state dependence from heterogeneity confirms that 




simulation analysis confirms that the state dependence estimates are exaggerated 
without the choice-consumption mismatch data. The estimated level of state dependence 
is higher when we ignore households that have received free upgrades.  
We later use the model estimates to perform counterfactual simulations to study the 
impact of implementing free upgrade policies. We find that due to our estimated level of 
state dependence an upgrade to a higher margin better class has long-term positive 
effects on revenue, in that consumers rent from the higher class in the future. To 
highlight potential confounding effects of unobserved heterogeneity, we show that these 
increases in revenue are estimated to be markedly larger than what is true when state 
dependence is inferred based on the sub-sample of households that did not receive 
upgrades and for whom therefore estimates of state dependence are exaggerated due to 
the confound with heterogeneity. 
2  Related Literature 
Functional form assumptions and choice set variation are commonly exploited in 
research about state dependence (Ackerberg, 2003; Erdem and Keane, 1996; Erdem and 
Sun, 2001; Keane, 1997; Osborne, 2010; Seetharaman, 2004). However, there remain 
concerns about the validity of such assumptions. For instance, Paulson (2011) argues 
that simulation-based estimation procedures rely too heavily on correctly specifying the 
structure of unobserved heterogeneity. Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) relax these 
functional form assumptions and offer a semi-parametric approach to flexibly account 
for heterogeneity in order to disentangle state dependence and unobserved 
heterogeneity. To aid in their identification, the authors exploit variation in price 
discounts as a means to vary choice sets. In a similar manner as price discounts, 
Goldfarb (2006b) exploits variation in choice sets11 of online portals due to exogenous 
                                                          
11 Although Bruno and Vilcassim (2008) do not study long-run effects, variation in retail stock-outs may 




changes in availability following denial of service attacks, Handel (2013) uses a change 
to insurance provision, Thomadsen (2012) uses variation in store choice, and Liu, 
Derdenger, and Sun (2013) exploit differences in compatibility between various base 
products and add-ons that affect the choice set for purchasing add-ons.  
Paulson (2012) argues that price promotions alone may not induce enough variation in 
choice sets to facilitate the disentangling of state dependence from heterogeneity. The 
main issue is that past purchase decisions are always going to be functions of 
unobserved heterogeneity; to truly disentangle state dependence the variation in choice 
sets need to be sufficiently large to induce purchases that would not have been made 
otherwise. Her suggestion is to supplement choice set variation in prices with 
demographic and/or survey data. For instance, Shin, Misra, and Horsky (2012), and 
Pavlidis and Ellickson (2012) use supplementary survey response data, while Goldfarb 
(2006a) and Gupta, Chintagunta, and Wittink (1997) incorporate household-specific 
heterogeneity using demographic data. Regardless of how well this additional 
information generates variation in choice sets, the core issue that Paulson (2012) 
brought up remains, as past decisions are still affected by unobserved heterogeneity. It 
is this core identification problem that our new exclusion restriction based approach 
addresses by exploiting mismatches between choice and actual consumption. 
3  Identification of State Dependence 
3.1  Model and Identification Problem 
In this section, we introduce and implement a Monte Carlo simulation exercise to 
demonstrate the identification power of forced substitution via mismatches between 
choice and consumption. These simulations are meant to illustrate that mismatches help 




For these simulations, we consider a simple discrete choice model in which customer i  
chooses to purchase among {1,2,..., }j J  products or services. A customer who chooses 
product j  during transaction t  is denoted as 
it
d j . Choosing the baseline option of 1 
yields zero utility for the customer. To be consistent with our empirical application, we 
consider the case here where products are vertically differentiated, and increase in 
quality such that 
1j j
.12 Therefore, a customer receives the following utility from 
it
d j : 
ijt j ijt ijt i it
U p s  
A customer chooses j  if and only if 
ijt ikt
U U  for all k j . Persistent unobserved 




 is an i.i.d. Type I Extreme 
Value random variable, and prices are given by 
ijt
p . Structural state dependence is 




s c j  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the customer consumed the same product in the previous transaction.  
Our primary objective is to obtain as accurate of an estimate for structural state 
dependence as possible, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. It is well known 
that persistence in behaviors can be caused by unobserved heterogeneity, as past 
consumption is usually correlated with 
i
. In the typical case, 
it it
d c , then is clear 
that past brand choice decisions (and therefore consumption) are correlated with 
unobserved preferences that persist over time as. Therefore, estimates of  will be 
confounded by 
i
. To avoid such confounds, one would then need some method of 
varying 
1it
d  in ways that are independent of unobserved preferences. 
                                                          




3.2  Identification Based on Choice-Consumption Mismatch 
As explained earlier, the choice-consumption mismatch varies 
1it
d  independent of 
unobserved preferences to help disentangle state dependence from heterogeneity. 
Figure 1 Diagram Illustrating Mismatch Between Choice and Consumption 
 
Figure 1 provides a decision diagram that describes potential mismatches between 
choice and consumption (
it it
d c ). Here, a customer who has originally chosen option j  
may potentially be forced to consume a different product *j . We denote such an event 
as 1
it
m . This mismatch event occurs with a probability of  that is independent of 
customer characteristics (e.g., supply driven factors such as inventory shortages).  




it it i it
c m  
|
1 1i it it
c m  
We now illustrate the conditions for which choice-consumption mismatches serve as an 




induced by factors exogenous to the customer (as in the examples described in the 
introduction), the assumption that 
1i it
m  holds.  
Based on the model we have described, we can write lagged consumption in light of 
choice-consumption mismatches as follows:  
*
1 1 1 1
(1 ) , ), ,(
it it it i it
c m d m j  
It then becomes clear that as the probability of a mismatch increases, the degree to 
which 
i
 confounds the expected consumption measure approaches zero. Consequently, 
the requirement that |
1 1i it it
c m  is likely to be satisfied with large values of . 
Researchers have in the past disentangled structural state dependence from unobserved 
heterogeneity using choice set variation. Using a similar model as before, we now 
explore the identification power of such variation in the. The difference now is that 
instead of a potential mismatch between choice and consumption, there is a probability, 
which we denote as , that a customer’s choice set changes. For our exposition, we 
frame these choice set changes around price discounts. In the event that a customer 
faces a change in the choice set, the new price for j  is *
ijt ijt
p p , where (0,1)  is the 
fraction of the original price that the customer would have had to pay. With this new 
choice set, the customer then makes decision *
it
d , instead of 
it
d . When the customer does 
not encounter a choice set change, the price remains at 
ijt
p . Based on the model we 
have described, we can write lagged consumption in light of price discounts as follows: 
*
1 1 1 1 1
((1 ) , , ( ),), , , ,
it it it i it it i




Notice that even when the probability of a change in consumption set is large via 
frequent price discounting, lagged consumption remains a function of unobserved 
preferences. Hence while choice set variation can reduce the bias, it can almost never 
truly debias the state dependence estimate. 
3.3  Monte Carlo Analysis 
We now illustrate using a simulation the bias reduction benefits of the choice-
consumption mismatch strategy for identifying state dependence.  
For our first set of simulations, we consider a scenario with 1,000 customers who make 5 
repeat purchases each, and are potentially faced with choice-consumption mismatches. 
Each customer can choose between three products, {1,2,3}j , where product 1 is the 





0.8  respectively. Here, product 3 is of a higher 
quality than product 2. Price sensitivity is set at 0.3 . State dependence effects are 
set at 0.6 . For the variance of unobserved heterogeneity, we set 5 . We try 
different values for the mismatch probability, namely {0.25,0.5,0.75} . For the prices 
of products 2 and 3, we draw them from a truncated Normal distribution with means 
0.2 and 0.9 respectively. 
With each parameterization, we forward simulate the sequence of choices (
it
d ) and 
actual consumption (
it
c ) for each customer, which serve as the simulated datasets for 
our subsequent estimations. To implement the choice-consumption mismatches, we try 
to mimic an environment in which customers are given free upgrades. Therefore, with 
probability , customers who had originally chosen the lower two options, 1 and 2, may 




For our next set of simulations, we consider again a scenario with 1,000 customers who 
make 5 transactions each and face the possibility of facing a new choice set with 
probability . We set the same parameters as before. In these simulations, we now have 
the additional parameter, which is the price discount set at 1 0.25 . This price 
discount is applied to product 3. 
Table 1 Estimates for Structural State Dependence Using Simulated Data 
  Choice-consumption mismatch Choice set variation 
   Estimate SE 95% CI % bias Estimate SE 95% CI % bias 
25% 1.249 0.007 1.235 1.262 108% 1.559 0.012 1.537 1.582 160% 
50% 0.819 0.006 0.807 0.831 37% 1.363 0.013 1.338 1.388 127% 
75% 0.606 0.007 0.593 0.619 1% 1.322 0.015 1.293 1.352 120% 
 
We can then estimate the model parameters using each of the simulated datasets. To 
estimate this discrete choice model, we use simulated maximum likelihood. Table 1 
provides us the estimates of structural state dependence from each of the simulated 
datasets. The first three columns provide us the results from simulations that exploit 
the choice-consumption mismatches, while the latter three columns provide us the 
results from simulations that exploit choice set variation. Recall that the data was 
generated with the state dependence parameter 0.6 , we wish to determine how 
effective the choice-consumption mismatch and choice set variation are at eliminating 
the bias.  
We first look at the bias reduction from increasing the mismatch probability, as 
suggested earlier in our discussion about identification. Confirming the intuition behind 
our assertion, we see that the estimates approach the true value as  increases. Most 
importantly, the bias is virtually eliminated when customers face a high probability of 
choice-consumption mismatch. Furthermore, the true value of state dependence lies 
within the 95% confidence interval for the estimates. In our simulations with variation 




less than in our simulations with the choice-consumption mismatch; the confidence 
interval does not include the true parameter value even with high probability of choice 
set variation. 
To summarize, this Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates the benefit of exploiting the 
choice-consumption mismatch in disentangling state dependence and heterogeneity, the 
greater the frequency with which such mismatches occur, the greater the potential to 
reduce the bias in estimates of state dependence due to the confound with unobserved 
heterogeneity. In fact, unlike choice set variation that does not completely eliminate 
bias, the mismatch approach has the potential to completely debias the state 
dependence estimate.  
4  Empirical Application: Car Rental Industry 
4.1  Data Description 
Our setting is the car rental industry, in which we utilize a sample of data from an 
international car rental company on repeat transactions of customers from 2011 to 2012. 
Repeat customers are identified in the data via their loyalty program membership.  
As shown in Table 2, about 20% of the users rented 2 times, while about 6% and 2% 
rented 3 and 4 times respectively. The remaining 3% of users rented 5 or more times. As 
our empirical analysis of state dependence will be based on the car class choice among 
travelers, we focus on the subset of customers that have booked with the car rental 
company at least twice over the course of 2 years. This leaves us with nearly 100,000 
transactions. As is standard in the choice literature, we assume here that customers who 
rent only once and customers who rent multiple times are not different in terms of their 
unobserved preferences towards car class alternatives.  
For each transaction, we can identify which car class was booked, driven, and paid for. 




car rental.14 In the event that a user drives a higher class than was originally booked, 
and pays for the higher class, we would classify that transaction as being an upsell. 
About 2% of the sample contains such upsell transactions. In the event that a user 
drives a higher class than was originally booked, but pays the same amount as for the 
class that was originally booked, we would classify that transaction as being an upgrade. 
Upgrades occur in about 51% of the sample. This high upgrade probability suggests that 
the empirical application using car rental data will benefit from our new identification 
strategy that exploits the choice-consumption mismatch. Based on the previously 
reported simulation, we know the choice-consumption mismatch data is more effective 
in debiasing state dependence estimate when the proportion of mismatches is high. 
Table 2 Distribution of the Number of Transactions Across Users 
Transactions Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 219,491 69.53 69.53 
2 58,186 18.43 87.96 
3 19,554 6.19 94.15 
4 6,988 2.21 96.36 
5 2,790 0.88 97.25 
6 1,440 0.46 97.7 
7 931 0.29 98 
8 752 0.24 98.24 
9 504 0.16 98.4 
10 560 0.18 98.57 
11 418 0.13 98.71 
12 324 0.1 98.81 
13 286 0.09 98.9 
14 294 0.09 98.99 
15 195 0.06 99.05 
16 224 0.07 99.12 
17 187 0.06 99.18 
18 162 0.05 99.24 
19 95 0.03 99.27 
20 240 0.08 99.34 
 
                                                          
14 This assertion is based on insights obtained during a conference call with the car rental company’s 
executives facilitated by Wharton’s Customer Analytics Initiative on October 4, 2013. Due to a 
confidentiality agreement with the car rental company, we are unable to disclose exactly which exact 
models belong to each car class. Note that in the data there is actually a 26th class. This class is assigned 
to car models that belong to a range of different classes. Given the potential inaccuracies of this particular 




Figure 2 Distribution of Car Class Choices 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of car class choices across transactions.16 From this 
histogram we see that users are primarily booking and paying for lower class cars (i.e., 
below 6). However, in classes 1-4, which constitutes a significant fraction of the overall 
transactions, a large fraction of customers do not end up driving the same car they 
reserved. It appears that classes 6, 12 and 17 are the most commonly used cars for 
providing free upgrades (i.e., they constitute about 32, 15 and 18 percent of the cars 
that users drive upon receiving upgrades). Class 3 has a higher proportion of people 
paying for it than that reserved, suggesting this class is used by the firm for upsell to 
those who book in classes 1 and 2 (i.e., about 45 percent of customers who originally 
booked classes 1 and 2 are upsold to class 3). 
Table 3 Summary Statistics for Trip Characteristics 
  Full sample Upgrade No upgrade 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Airport 0.429 0.495 0.422 0.494 0.437 0.496 
Phone reserve 0.114 0.318 0.117 0.321 0.111 0.314 
Business 0.382 0.486 0.405 0.491 0.357 0.479 
Weekend 0.473 0.499 0.465 0.499 0.482 0.500 
Duration 4.229 6.467 4.254 6.855 4.203 6.034 
# transactions 2.386 3.804 2.739 4.693 2.016 2.512 
Price 205.040 240.574 188.786 223.656 222.033 255.975 
Age 52.308 11.828 51.923 11.812 52.710 11.831 
Tier 1.970 1.132 2.138 1.214 1.795 1.011 
Observations 96209 49174 47035 
 
                                                          
16 For visual clarity, note that the figure does not display the percentage of transactions that involve car 



















Other trip characteristics that we incorporate in our analysis include whether the car is 
rented from an airport location, is booked over the phone, is for business purposes, 
and/or is a weekend rental.  We see also know the duration of each rental. From Table 
3, about 40% of the transactions occur via airport rental locations, 11% are booked via 
phone, 38% are for business purposes, and 47% occur on the weekend. The typical car 
rental length is about 4 days. A user spends on average about $205 per transaction. The 
average tier of a customer is about 2, where 1 is the lowest tier and 7 is the highest.17 
We now provide a comparison of summary statistics across users based on whether or 
not they received upgrades. This comparison serves to demonstrate that the observable 
user-trip characteristics are similar across the two sub-samples. In general, the mean 
and standard deviation looks quite similar across the sub-samples. The only noticeable 
difference is in prices, in which upgraded customers appear to be paying $30 less than 
customers who did not receive free upgrades. 
4.2  Empirical Patterns of Upgrades 
Upgrades generate choice-consumption mismatches by forcing users to experience classes 
that are different (and higher) than the classes originally booked, but without any 
additional cost. For our identification approach, we rely on the assumption that these 
mismatches are exogenous to consumer preferences. Based on the market environment, 
we suggested that these upgrades are driven by supply considerations such as inventory. 
It is also possible that upgrades are linked to elite status and other consumer/trip 
characteristics. To the extent we are able to control for such observable consumer/trip 
characteristics in the upgrading propensity, the supply side instruments related to 
inventory would serve to provide the necessary exclusion restrictions for the choice-
consumption mismatch strategy to work.  
                                                          
17 Higher tiers are considered to be more “elite.” Based on information provided by Wharton’s Customer 
Analytics Initiative, tier level membership is based on the number of rental transactions, number of rental 
days, a monthly or annual fee, or some combination of all three. However, it was not disclosed by the car 




Table 4 Summary Statistics for Inventory Conditions 
      Percentile     
Variable Mean Std. Dev 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Min Max 
# check-out 1.128 0.453 1 1 1 1 3 1 9 
Net supply 0.003 0.463 -1 0 0 0 1 -8 5 
 
We focus on three variables that may be used to proxy for stock-outs. As the data itself 
does not contain inventory information, we have to infer general demand-supply 
conditions using the available information.18 Table 4 provides summary statistics for the 
supply-side proxies we use. 
The first variable we consider is the total number of check-outs for the current reserved 
transaction class at a particular location within the hour of rental. This measure gives 
us an idea about the demand for specific car classes at each rental location. With this 
measure, one hypothesis we first test is whether upgrade propensity increases with the 
demand for cars. The intuition is that if demand is high for the car class that is booked, 
then the chance that this booked class is no longer available is high, and thus, a greater 
likelihood of receiving a free upgrade. Figure 3 confirms that there is indeed a 
disproportionately larger amount of transactions with upgrades as the demand is high 
(i.e., 2 or more check-outs versus only 1 check-out). 
Figure 3 Percentage Difference Between the Number of Transactions With and Without Upgrades 
 
                                                          





















The second variable we consider is the total number of check-ins net of the total 
number of check-outs at a particular location at the time of a transaction. As the 
number of check-ins help proxy for the number of cars returned, and the number of 
check-outs proxy for the number of cars demanded, the net difference of these variables 
may be interpreted as the net supply (or flow) of available cars. Our second hypothesis 
is to test whether or not upgrade propensity decreases with this measure. If the net 
supply is high, then the stock-out probability is low, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
free upgrades. Figure 4 confirms our intuition, since the percentage difference between 
the number of transactions with and without upgrades diminishes as net supply 
increases (i.e., negative net supply versus positive net supply). 
Figure 4 Percentage Difference Between the Number of Transactions With and Without Upgrades 
 
Using these supply-side measures, we estimate two different probit specifications with 
user-level random effects. Table 5 presents the main upgrade patterns in our data. The 
first column highlights our analysis using the proxy for demand. First note that 
upgrades are correlated with trip/user characteristics. For instance, a user is less likely 
to receive an upgrade at an airport, or on a weekend. Older customers, as well as those 
paying a higher price are also less likely to receive a free upgrade. In contrast, business 
users, high volume users, and those that belong to a higher tier are more likely to 





















Table 5 Probit Specification for Upgrade Propensity 
  Upgrade Upgrade 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE 
# check-out 0.0510*** (0.00941) 
  Net supply 
  
-0.0221* (0.00861) 
Airport -0.0810*** (0.00954) -0.0729*** (0.00940) 
Phone reserve -0.0249 (0.0142) -0.0259 (0.0142) 
Business 0.176*** (0.00909) 0.179*** (0.00906) 
Weekend -0.0140 (0.00877) -0.0151 (0.00876) 
Duration 0.0423*** (0.00174) 0.0422*** (0.00174) 
# transactions 0.0215*** (0.00181) 0.0219*** (0.00180) 
Price -0.00154*** (0.0000605) -0.00153*** (0.0000603) 
Age -0.00231*** (0.000374) -0.00236*** (0.000374) 
Tier 0.109*** (0.00408) 0.109*** (0.00408) 
Constant -0.211 (0.160) -0.144 (0.161) 
Random effects Yes Yes 
Observations 96209 96209 
 
Most importantly, we see that upgrade propensity increases with demand. Analogously, 
the second column confirms a negative relationship between upgrade propensity and net 
supply. Even after targeting strategies based on user/trip type are controlled for, we 
provide empirical evidence that highlights a relationship between supply-side conditions 
and free upgrades.19 These results motivate further the idea that choice-consumption 
mismatches (through upgrades) are likely to be driven by “exogenous” factors. 
4.3  Model 
This section presents the random utility logit model with endogeneity and structural 
state dependence that we use in our empirical application. The model contains two 
stages. First, customers choose the car class they wish to rent in the reservation stage. 
After making the reservation, customers reach the point of consumption stage, at which 
point the car class they end up driving may or may not be the same as the class 
originally chosen. 
 
                                                          
19 Note that we also tried specifications with upsells as the dependent variable. In these specifications, we 
find no empirical relationship between upselling propensity and supply-side conditions. The main drivers 




4.3.1  Reservation Stage 
In the reservation stage, each customer i  decides on which car class to rent at the 
beginning of each transaction t ; we denote the decision to choose car class j  as 
{1,2,...,J}
it
d j . Customers decide on classes that yield the highest utility, where 
utility is defined as: 
ijt j it ijt ij ijt
U X s  
Customers make their decisions based on trip characteristics, represented by the vector 
it
X . Furthermore, as higher car classes are of higher quality, we include a car class 
intercept 
j
, which we assume gets larger as j  increases. There may be unobserved and 
persistent factors as to why some car classes are inherently preferred by some customers, 
which we model using random effects 2(0, )
ij
N . The error term 
ijt
 follows an i.i.d. 
Type I Extreme Value distribution.  




s c j , which is an 
indicator for whether in the previous transaction, the user actually drove class j  in the 
previous transaction.  
4.3.2  Point of Consumption Stage 
Each transaction is completed at the point of consumption, which is when customers 
pick up the car keys at the sales desk. Upon the customer’s arrival to the point of 
consumption, the customer may end up driving a different class than the one originally 
booked in the reservation stage for two reasons. First, the customer may receive a free 
car class upgrade to class UGj j , which we indicate with 1UG
it




customer may accept an upsold class USj j , which we indicate with 1US
it
m . 
Therefore, the customer’s past consumption can be expressed in a similar manner as our 
earlier Monte Carlo analysis: 
1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )(1 )
UG US UG UG US US
it it it it it itc m m d m j m j            
Based on this specification, it is clear that 1 1it itc d   is possible. This specification 
suggests potential endogeneity in the past consumption 




itm   and 1
US
itm  . To address this endogeneity issue, we employ a 
limited information maximum likelihood approach along the lines of Villas-Boas and 
Winer (1999).     
The first source of endogeneity comes from upgrades, as the description of our data 
reveals that they may be targeted. One assumption we make here is that once customers 
receive a free class upgrade option, we assume that they accept doing so allows them to 
drive a higher quality car without paying a higher price. Therefore, we focus on 
modeling the firm’s decision about whether or not to provide the free upgrade. Here, the 
latent payoff to the firm for providing an upgrade is defined as:  
it it it
Z  
In addition to the user-trip characteristics that enter into a customer’s utility, the latent 
payoff from initiating an upgrade incorporates the total number of check-outs and net 
supply. Both user characteristics and supply-side conditions are then included in the 
vector 
it
Z . The error term here is denoted by 
it
, which we assume to follow an i.i.d. 
Type I Extreme Value distribution. We denote the distribution for 
it
 that rationalizes 
1UG
it
m  as ( )
it




The second source of endogeneity comes from upsells. Based on the institutional details 
from our empirical setting, we assume that some customers are presented with 
opportunities to be upsold. Sales representatives may induce customers to switch and 
pay for a higher class via some price discount, which we represent as 
it
X . As certain 
types of customers appear more likely to receive and accept upsells, we allow the price 
discount benefit to be a function of observable user-trip characteristics. We now discuss 
how the distribution that rationalizes 1US
it
m  can be recovered. Note that at the 
reservation stage, class j  was chosen over class USj  as USijt ij tU U ; but at the point of 
consumption, the sales agent’s marketing efforts may lead to US
US
ijtij t
U U  where: 
US US US US US
US
it itij t j ij t ij ij t
U X X s  
Notice here that the main difference between US
US
ij t
U  and USij tU  is the term itX . Thus, 
1US
it
m  would hold provided that the condition US
US
ijtij t
U U  is satisfied: 
11
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0US US US US US
US
ijt it j ijt ij ijtij t j ij t ij ij t
U U X s s  
4.3.3  Econometric Specification 
With the consumer choice model, along with the data generating processes for 
upgrading and upselling decisions, we can now specify the likelihood for structural 
estimation. The likelihood function is therefore written as: 
1 1
({ } , , , , , )




it ijt ij it it ijt ij ijij t ij ij t ij
t j j j
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The term ( , | , )US USijt ijij t ijf  is the joint probability density function implied by the 
upsell acceptance decisions by customers. This joint probability density function is 
conditional on unobserved heterogeneity as a customer ultimately decides whether or 
not to accept the upsell. Finally, the car class choice decision is captured by 
( | , , , )USit it ijt ijij tg d , which can be written as: 
( | , , , )
exp( )
exp( )
USit it ijt ijij t
j it ijt ij ijt






To estimate the likelihood, we turn to simulated maximum likelihood (SML), which 
allows us to integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity terms. 
4.4  Main Estimates 
Given the model above, we consider two different specifications. To highlight the 
importance of variation in past upgrades, we compare the state dependence estimates 
across two samples: (1) the entire sample of transactions and (2) sub-sample of 
observations that exclude customers who received two or more free upgrades previously.  
Table 6 Key Estimates from the Structural Model 
  Full sample Sub-sample 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE 
State dependence ( ) 0.620*** (0.144) 2.249*** (1.021) 
Unobserved heterogeneity ( ) 0.932*** (0.120) 0.935*** (0.225) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Random effects Yes Yes 





Table 6 highlights the estimated state dependence and heterogeneity parameters.20 In 
both cases, unobserved heterogeneity is present and the estimated variance for 
unobserved heterogeneity is similar. However, the structural state dependence effects are 
exaggerated when we exclude customers who received two or more free upgrades. These 
empirical results are consistent with our earlier Monte Carlo analysis, as inferred state 
dependence decreases (towards the true value) with the frequency of choice-consumption 
mismatches.  
4.5  Economic Value of a Free Upgrade Policy 
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of free upgrades as a promotional tool. The 
presence of state dependence implies that policies such as free upgrades or samples may 
have carry-over effects over time. Furthermore, we investigate the extent to which our 
evaluation of free upgrade policies is affected by biases in inferred state dependence.  
For this analysis, we pick the most frequently booked class 3, and offer free upgrades to 
all customers who pick that class. Upgraded customers then have the opportunity to 
drive a class that is one level up, so the upgraded class would be 4. Given this 
promotion policy, we simulate the customer car class choice behavior in subsequent 
purchases. Combined with average prices for each car class, the simulated decisions 
under the various scenarios are then used to construct simulated revenues across classes. 
With the counterfactual upgrade policy, we then compare the revenues without the free 
upgrades, to the revenues with free upgrades. Intuitively, one would expect the 
introduction of free upgrades would increase the revenue for class 4, while at the same 
time, decrease the revenue for class 3.  
We then repeat this analysis using fitted model based on the sub-sample of observations 
which exclude customers who received upgrades in the past. Note that for comparability 
                                                          




between the simulations based on full sample and sub-sample estimates, we use the 
same number of customers when performing these simulations. Table 7 highlights the 
main findings from these counterfactual simulations. The first two columns compare the 
revenue across scenarios without and with free upgrades using the fitted model, while 
the latter two columns compare the revenue across scenarios without and with free 
upgrades using the fitted based on the sub-sample that excludes customers that received 
two or more upgrades in the past. Although we do not have data on cost, policies that 
shift customers towards the higher classes are presumed to be profitable, as margins are 
most likely larger for the higher classes. Therefore, a free upgrade campaign may be 
profitable via its ability to induce inertial choices towards more profitable car classes.  
Table 7 Economic Value of Providing Free Upgrades 
  Full sample Sub-sample 
Class No upgrade Upgrade No upgrade Upgrade 
1 $17,202 $17,871 $17,477 $19,123 
2 $75,556 $78,344 $68,544 $73,646 
3 $243,450 $220,760 $240,300 $178,240 
4 $46,213 $56,387 $41,935 $83,896 
5 $1,117 $1,158 $698 $744 
6 $223,830 $230,850 $253,940 $266,280 
7 $9,176 $9,521 $6,744 $7,217 
8 $849 $874 $643 $694 
9 $5,743 $5,967 $3,306 $3,555 
11 $1,405 $1,460 $1,201 $1,295 
12 $39,665 $41,078 $32,770 $34,624 
13 $825 $851 $41 $42 
14 $585 $613 $15 $16 
16 $1,516 $1,569 $1,193 $1,286 
17 $27,586 $28,537 $28,565 $30,002 
18 $18,844 $19,517 $18,470 $19,790 
19 $1,617 $1,672 $1,403 $1,498 
20 $12,462 $12,931 $10,371 $11,115 
21 $2,572 $2,666 $1,292 $1,391 
22 $807 $843 $642 $697 
23 $635 $657 $179 $191 
24 $730 $757 $870 $942 





As expected, revenue increases for classes 4 after the free upgrade policy, while revenues 
decrease for classes 3. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that the free upgrade policy may 
have positive effects that carry into non-promoted classes. The reason we see such 
patterns is that by upgrading customers who originally picked 3 to car class 4, the 
policy effectively lowers the latent utility for 3 via the state dependence effect. Although 
most customers will be drawn to the upgraded class 4 in subsequent transactions due to 
state dependence, there remains a subset of them who will choose alternative classes in 
light of the lowered utility from consuming 3. For instance, one subset may consist of 
customers who originally picked class 3, but switch into classes 1 and 2 after being 
upgraded class 4. Alternatively, another subset may include those who switch into car 
classes even higher than 4, such as 6. The car rental company would benefit more from 
the latter subset of customers, as opposed to the former group. Notice however that the 
extent to which the free upgrade policy spills into other classes approaches zero as these 
classes move further away from 3. 
Figure 5 Change in Revenues Across Classes After Free Upgrade Policy 
 
When we compare these results with those generated using the fitted model based on 
the sub-sample, we see that the economic benefit of free upgrades is larger in terms of 































class is noticeably larger than that obtained from our analysis using the full sample. 
This finding leads us to believe that the exclusion of choice-consumption mismatch data 
may result in overly optimistic assessments about the tangible benefits of free upgrade 
campaigns. Ultimately, these overoptimistic forecasts would lead us to pursue more 
promotional campaigns (that are costly) than truly warranted. 
5  Conclusion 
We introduce a new empirical strategy for identifying structural state dependence that 
exploits mismatches between choice and consumption. These mismatches help us 
(partially) break the correlation between past consumption and unobserved preferences, 
and will ultimately facilitate more optimal dynamic marketing strategies. In our Monte 
Carlo analysis, we demonstrate that in simulated datasets where free upgrades are 
frequently offered to customers, the bias in inferred state dependence can be reduced 
almost entirely. In contrast, existing approaches using choice set variation via price 
discounts is not very effective in eliminating the bias.  
To apply our identification method, we estimate state dependence using data on repeat 
transactions from the car rental service industry. Free upgrades happen very frequently 
in the data, and are correlated with supply-side conditions pertaining to inventory. Such 
institutional features provide us an ideal environment to study and exploit mismatches 
between choice and consumption.  
Two main results emerge from this empirical analysis. First, we confirm the presence of 
state dependence in a simple multinomial choice model that allows for unobserved 
customer-level random effects. Second, we show that inferred state dependence may be 
overstated if variation in past free upgrades is ignored. The second result allows us to 
conclude that unobserved heterogeneity is a relevant issue, and that free upgrades can 




results from Monte Carlo analysis that state dependence is exaggerated in the absence 
of exclusion restrictions obtained through mismatches between choice and consumption.  
Counterfactual analysis using the estimated model illustrate that the estimated level of 
state dependence has significant marginal effects on subsequent purchasing decisions. 
Furthermore, the same analysis using a sub-sample of observations that exclude users 
who received upgrades yields overstated effects, confirming the managerial importance 
of correctly disentangling state dependence and heterogeneity. Finally, we show that 
free upgrade campaigns can have long-run benefits; such campaigns shift purchases 
towards upgraded higher-end cars higher margins over the long term. But when choice-
consumption mismatches are omitted in estimation of state dependence, the projections 
of increase in revenue shares of promoted higher-end classes are overstated. 
From a practical standpoint, our new method for disentangling state dependence and 
unobserved heterogeneity can be applied to a variety of settings for which researchers 
can record as data, stated choices and actual consumption. For example, if we are using 
data from the service industry, we would need to know which option is reserved, and 
which option is actually experienced at the point of consumption. If instead we are 
using data from online retail, we would record which items are purchased, in addition to 
which items are actually delivered. Furthermore, our identification approach opens the 
door to experimentation strategies for managers as a means to more accurately estimate 
demand systems with state dependence by randomly selecting customers for free service 
upgrades or product switches upon shipment. Ultimately, the more accurate inferences 
about state dependence will not only improve dynamic advertising, marketing mix, 
pricing, promotion, and targeting strategies, but also provide more accurate predictions 
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A  Additional Details about Estimates 
Table 8 Complete Set of Model Estimates from the Empirical Application 
  Full sample Sub-sample 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE 
State dependence 0.620 0.144 2.249 1.021 
Variance for unobserved heterogeneity 0.932 0.120 0.935 0.225 
Customer car class decision 
    Airport 0.631 0.018 0.500 3.480 
Phone reserve 0.118 0.007 0.231 1.656 
Business 0.041 0.121 0.146 3.732 
Weekend 0.924 0.184 0.722 4.565 
Duration 0.200 2.042 -0.034 2.179 
# transactions -0.003 8.857 0.000 1.168 
Price -0.012 0.417 -0.051 0.110 
Age 0.178 0.380 -0.111 2.604 
Tier 0.620 0.144 2.249 1.021 
Upgrade decision         
Airport -0.932 0.120 -0.935 0.225 
Phone reserve -0.031 0.003 -0.037 0.000 
Business 0.917 0.000 0.900 0.001 
Weekend -0.316 0.002 -0.254 0.000 
Duration 0.703 0.000 0.631 0.001 
# transactions 0.341 0.010 0.040 0.003 
Price 0.837 0.825 -0.875 0.000 
Age -0.820 0.269 -0.255 0.028 
Tier 0.884 0.003 0.603 0.001 
# check-out 0.954 0.504 1.406 0.139 
Net supply -5.695 1.348 -5.933 0.093 
Upsell decision         
Airport 0.006 0.020 0.007 0.036 
Phone reserve -0.450 0.042 -0.458 0.076 
Business -0.190 0.021 -0.211 0.039 
Weekend -0.027 0.019 -0.040 0.034 
Duration 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
# transactions 0.014 0.002 0.041 0.003 
Price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age -0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
Tier 0.023 0.009 0.057 0.016 
 
